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UNITED STEELWORKERS v. U. S.

Scope Of The President's Power To Secure 80-Day
Injunction Against Continuation of Steel
Strike Under Labor Management
Relations Act, Section 208
United Steelworkers of America v. United States'

After a strike of more than three months by the United
Steelworkers of America (hereafter called the Union),
affecting plants representing 85 % of the nation's basic steel
production capability, the President appointed a board of
inquiry to report to him on the state of negotiations between the Union and the steel industry.2 The Board's subsequent report stated that no early settlement of the strike
could be foreseen.' Thereupon, the President ordered the
Attorney General to seek an 80-day injunction against the
Union's continuance of the strike,4 pursuant to Section 208
of the Labor Management Relations Act, which gives a
district court "jurisdiction to enjoin any ...strike or lock-

out" in interstate commerce which "affects an entire industry or a substantial part thereof" and "if permitted...
to continue, will imperil the national health or safety."5
The District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granted the injunction upon fact-findings that the
strike would produce an irreparable time-lag in the nation's military and research programs, and upon a further
fact-finding that the strike would adversely affect the nation's economic health because of the large number of
layoffs which would occur in related industries due to disappearing steel reserves.' The Court of Appeals affirmed,
Judge Hastie dissenting, 7 and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.'
In a per curiam opinion the Supreme Court affirmed the
judgments of the lower federal courts, Mr. Justice Douglas
dissenting.9 Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice
'361
U.S. 39,80 S.Ct. 1 (1959).
2
Exec. Order 10843, 24 F.R. 8289 (1959), amended by Exec. Order 10848,
24 F.R. 8401 (1959).
8United States v. United Steelworkers of America, 178 F. Supp. 297,
300 (D.C. Pa., 1959).
' Ibid., 299.
561 STAT. 155, Ch. 120, § 208 (1947), U.S.C.A. 178.
United tates v. United Steelworkers of America, 178 F. Supp. 297
(D.C. Pa., 1959).
1 United States v. United Steelworkers of America, 271 F. 2d 676 (3rd
Cir., 1959).
'United Steelworkers of America v. United States, 361 U.S. 878, 80
S.Ct. 143 (1959).
'Supra, n. 1.
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Harlan later filed a concurring opinion.' ° The Court found
that the District Court's findings that the strike affected
85% of the nation's basic steel production capability and
imperiled four military or quasi-military programs, fulfilled the statutory requirements for the injunction. Thus
it was unnecessary to decide whether the "national health"
included the nation's economic health as well as the physical health of the citizenry. The Court further determined
that the statute conferred a judicial task of finding whether
the conditions required for granting an injunction were
present, and not a legislative or executive one, since Congress had predetermined what the injunctive conditions
were to be.
Judge Hastie's dissent in the Court of Appeals had been
predicated upon the view that an injunction should not
issue unless the government made a positive showing that
the injunction would facilitate a settlement of the dispute."
The Supreme Court denied the validity of this reasoning,
emphatically stating that the "basic purpose" of Section
208 was "to see that vital production should be resumed or
continued for a time while further efforts were made to
settle the dispute."' 2 The Court further stated that Congress did not intend the issuance of a Section 208 injunction to depend upon inquiries into such matters as the
availability of other remedies, the effect of an injunction on
the collective bargaining process, the merits of the parties'
positions, or the conduct of the parties in their negotiations. It would seem that the removal of the abovementioned factors for equitable consideration has severely
modified or entirely eliminated any equitable discretion
with respect to the propriety of granting an injunction,
once the statutory bases for the injunction have been
found. Hence, by inference from the majority opinion and
as clearly stated by the concurring opinion, 3 Congress has
10United Steelworkers
S.Ct. 177 (1959).
SSupra, n. 7, 960.

of America v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 80

'361 U.S. 39, 80 S.Ct. 1 (1959).
Supra, n. 10. The opinion states, at p. 183:
"* * * We conclude that under the national emergency provisions of
the Labor Management Relations Act it is not for the judiciary to
exercise conventional 'discretion' to withhold an 'eighty-day' Injunction upon a balancing of conveniences.
"'Discretionary' jurisdiction is exercised when a given injunctive
remedy is not commanded as a matter of policy by Congress, but is,
as a presupposition of judge-made law, left to judicial discretion.
Such is not the case under this statute. The purpose of Congress
expressed by the scheme of this statute precludes ordinary equitable
discretion. * * *"
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made it mandatory that an injunction be granted after the
requisite fact-findings are made.
Section 208 says, that if the district court finds the
statutory requisites, "it shall have jurisdiction to enjoin
such strikes. . . ." It does not say, "it shall enjoin such
strikes ... ." This language of the Act could reasonably be
construed as permissive rather than mandatory. If Congress had meant to deviate from the traditional principle
regarding equity, that the chancellor has discretion to act
rather than an absolute duty to act, it seems appropriate
that it would have used words expressly conferring such a
duty. 4 It is submitted that perhaps Congress did intend
to give the district court only a narrow discretion to decline
to grant the injunction if the statutory bases for it were
present, but did not intend to completely abolish the
court's equitable discretion. 5 This contention stems from
the fact that Section 208 was intended, when the Act was
passed, to apply mainly to the bituminous coal industry
rather than to the basic steel industry. 6 Indeed, the first
use of the Section 208 injunction was against the International Union, United Mine Workers." Strikes in the
bituminous coal industry had long threatened the physical
14Cf. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944), which was distinguished
from the noted case in the concurring opinion, supra, n. 10, 184-185. See
also Alabama v. United States, 279 U.S. 229 (1929), where the Supreme
Court held an act of Congress requiring the consideration of applications
for interlocutory injunctions in certain cases by three judges and allowing
appeal to the Supreme Court, had in no way modified the well-established
doctrine that such applications are addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial court. The Court reasoned, 230, that traditional equitable principles were applicable since "there was nothing in the legislation to suggest that in the exercise of judicial power In respect of such writs
pertinent principles of equity as heretofore understood, are to be disregarded or modified." Beach, Extent of Discretion Exercised by District
Courts in Issuing Temporary Injunctions Against Alleged Unfair Labor
Practices, 56 Mich. L. Rev. 102 (1958), provides an excellent comment on
the same problem within a labor area closely related to the Sec. 208 Injunction.
"Equity courts often narrow their discretion where a public interest
is involved. See Virginian Ry. v. System Federation, 300 U.S. 515, 552
(1937), where the Supreme Court said, "Courts of equity may, and frequently do, go much farther both to give and withhold relief In furtherance
of the public interest than they are accustomed to go when only private
interests are involved."
"eCox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Harv.
L. Rev. 274, 286 (1948), citing Senate Report No. 105, 80th Congress.
1st Session, 14 (1947), as relevant to this opinion. Note, The Injunction
Under the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 2 Rutgers L. Rev.
240 (1948), emphasizes the litigation regarding bituminous coal strikes
which immediately preceded the passage of the Labor Management Relations Act. Teller, The Taft-Hartley Act and "Government by Injunction,"
35 Va. L. Rev. 50 (1949), discusses in detail the labor cases and legislation
which led up to the Labor Management Relations Act.
"United States v. International Union, United Mine Workers, 77 F.
Supp. 563 (D.C.D.C., 1948).
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health of a large segment of the nation's citizenry; but as
dangerous as these strike conditions were, the remedy
necessary to abate them would not seem to require the
same degree of emergency as the remedy required to maintain defense production essential to the country's survival
in today's rocket age. But, although historically the above
approach may be correct, it could very plausibly be argued
that the Supreme Court has ruled otherwise - and an
injunction will accordingly issue henceforth whenever the
statutory requisites are met, without regard for the effect
such an injunction will have on the collective bargaining
between the union and industry involved.
Justice Douglas' dissent was founded on the ground that
less than 1% of the nation's steel production was needed
for defense; therefore a selective reopening of the plants
might be had upon remand to the District Court."8 Such
a result would have avoided sending the entire Union back
to work and would in part have retained the efficaciousness of the strike as a coercive weapon against the basic
steel industry. The majority opinion looked upon Section
208, however, as "a public remedy in times of emergency"
and refused to find any Congressional intent for "reorganization of the affected industry" in such times. 9
As of today, it is entirely foreseeable that the factual
situation present in the instant case, or an equivalent
factual situation, will also occur in any future steel strike,
due to the Cold War and the nation's attendant demand
upon the steel industry for defense production. Therefore,
the practical effect of the dominant opinion, although not
mentioned by the Court, will be to give the President the
power to use the Section 208 injunction shortly after the
onset of any steel strike, if not before its inception.
Those companies in the basic steel industry either having defense contracts or supplying steel to related industries with defense contracts, could avoid the Section 208
injunction for a time at least by stockpiling large steel reserves so that defense production would not be immediately curtailed by a strike. This seems unlikely. In the
first place, the related industries are the more logical
choice to stockpile steel rather than the steel producers
themselves. Secondly, the creation of such reserves in
either the basic steel industry or related industries would
seem prohibitive from an economic standpoint because of
the large storage cost of the reserves and the taxation
"United Steelworkers of America v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 80
S.Ct. 1, 5 (1959).
19Ibid., 3.
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which would be levied upon them in many cases. Finally,
so far as the Union is concerned, an injunctive delay caused
by stockpiling is fortuitous since it depends upon the act
of management; and it is the Union, not industry, which is
really harmed by the injunction.
One of the principal criticisms of the Section 208 injunction is that it forces the Union involved back to work
under pre-strike conditions.2 0 President Harry S. Truman,
in his message to Congress vetoing the Labor Management
Relations Act, stated:
"Furthermore, a fundamental inequity runs through
these provisions. The bill provides for injunctions to
prohibit workers from striking, even against terms
dictated by employers after contracts have expired.
There is no provision assuring the protection of the
rights of the employees during the period they are
deprived of the
right to protect themselves by eco'21
nomic action."
The injunction, being against the Union, also tends to throw
public opinion toward industry and away from the Union.2 2
Moreover, Section 209 of the Act expresses the undesirable
Congressional recognition of a dichotomy between the
Union leadership and the striking workers by providing
the workers with an opportunity to vote against a strike's
inception or continuance, as the case may be, before the
end of the injunctive period. The threat of such a vote is
quite likely to make the Union leadership more amenable
to settlement: a result adverse to their strike order could
mean the virtual end of power for the leadership, and for
the Union itself. 4
The writers believe that the inequities of the Section
208 injunction could be substantially decreased by the
adoption of flexible federal controls, as opposed to the
0 See law review articles, supra, n. 16.
mU.S.C. Cong. Svc., 80th Oongress, 1st 'Session, 1851, 1857 (1947).
2Note,
The Labor Management Relations Act and the Revivai of the
Labor Injunction, 48 Col. L. Rev. 759, 772 (1948), says, ". . . as in the
case of injunctions generally, the labor injunction tends to throw public
opinion on the side of management, the strikers being regarded as law
breakers."
'61 STAT. 155, Ch. 120, § 209 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. 179, states:
. . . the National Labor Relations Board, within the succeeding
fifteen days [after the injunction has been in effect 0 daysi, shall
take a secret ballot of the employees of each employer involved in
the dispute on the question of whether they wish to accept the final
offer of settlement made by their employer as stated by him and shall
certify the results thereof to the Attorney General within five days
thereafter."
Cox. op. cit., supra,n. 16, stresses this point.
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single remedy of injunction. Federal seizure of the affected industry seems a proper alternative to the injunction, seizure being somewhat detrimental to industry just
as the injunction is somewhat detrimental to labor, in so
far as ultimate settlement is concerned as well as the conditions of the temporary strike cessation. Changes in
wages and working conditions of the workers could, if
appropriate, be effected through seizure. More importantly, the choice of alternative remedies in the President's
power would evoke an apprehension in both parties to
the dispute, rather than in the Union alone, as to the
remedy which would be used, and would therefore tend
to encourage an early settlement on fair terms.
ROBERT J. CARSON
HOWARD S.

CHASANOW

Governmental Records Of Investigatory Nature
Not Open To Public Inspection
Whittle v. Munshower'
Petitioner's decedent had been employed at an aircraft
factory in Baltimore County for about three months prior
to his death on July 7, 1942. Although the cause of death
was officially listed as accidental drowning by the Maryland State Police, petitioner alleged that fellow employees
at the aircraft factory had conspired against the deceased
by claiming he "made a defective piece of material,"
thereby causing false charges of sabotage to be filed by
the FBI and Army Intelligence Personnel, and that such
charges "led to" the death of the deceased. In a writ of
mandamus filed against the Maryland State Police, the
petitioner alleged that the state police possessed information showing that the deceased had been officially charged
with making this "material"; but that, in addition, they possessed information which tended to clear the deceased of
this charge. Petitioner, therefore, sought the release of all
such information.
The lower court sustained a demurrer to the petition
without leave to amend. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
held that, since the record showed no entry of a final judgment, the appeal must be dismissed as being premature,
but took occasion, nevertheless, to express an opinion on
1221 Md. 258, 155 A. 2d 670 (1959).

